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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher Allen Stone appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to second-degree murder.

Stone challenges the district

court's denial of his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On August 29, 2010, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Corporal Paul Maund,
and several other officers, were dispatched to a residence in Caldwell, Idaho to
investigate a shooting.

(Tr., p.210, L.6 - p.211, L.15; R., p.10.) Upon arrival,

Corporal Maund saw two cars parked in the driveway of the residence and a
man, later identified as Stone, talking on his cell phone. (Tr., p.212, Ls.3-23.)
Corporal Maund ordered Stone to approach him at which time Stone told the
person he was talking to something along the lines of, "Okay, the police are here
now, I guess I'll hang up." (Tr., p.213, Ls.3-10.) As the officers made contact
with Stone, "he said it was self-defense, she had stabbed him and that he had to
do it."

(Tr., p.214, Ls.17-19.)

estranged wife, Florence.

The person Stone Was referring to was his

(R., p.10.)

Florence "was located a short distance

away slumped in the back of a mini-van parked in the driveway. She was laying
face down in a pool of blood with what appeared to be two gunshot wounds to
the back of her head." (R., p.10.)

1

Deputy Frank Hernandez read Stone his Miranda 1 rights while they waited
for medics to arrive. (Tr., p.225, L.13 - p.226, L.11; Exhibit 1, p.2, L.25 - p.3,
L.7.)

Stone said he understood his rights and "just began talking" to Deputy

Hernandez although Deputy Hernandez was not asking Stone any questions.
(Tr., p.226, Ls.11-22; Exhibit 1, p.3, Ls.8-9.) Stone volunteered his age, the fact
that he was a speech pathologist, and said "he'd never been arrested, never
been stabbed, nor had he ever shot anyone." (Tr., p.226, Ls.13-18.) Deputy
Hernandez testified Stone was calm, "[c]onsidering the circumstances."

(Tr.,

p.226, L.23 - p.227, L.1.)
Once the ambulance arrived, Deputy Hernandez accompanied Stone to
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of Stone's stab wound.
(Tr., p.227, Ls.2-11; R., p.10.) Deputy Hernandez was the only police officer in
the ambulance with Stone and only questioned Stone in response to statements
Stone made. (Tr., p.227, L.13 - p.228, L.17.) Deputy Hernandez remained with
Stone the entire time he was at the hospital. (Tr., p.228, Ls.7-9.) During this
time, Stone made numerous statements regarding his version of events. 2 (See
generally Exhibit 1.) Stone said Florence came over to pick up some of her
belongings, which he put on the porch because he would not let her into the
house. (Exhibit 1, p.19, Ls.20-25.) Stone then explained:

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

The transcript of this interaction only specifically identifies Stone as a speaker;
all others are described as "unidentified speaker." (See generally Exhibit 1.)
Thus, it is unclear who is asking questions and who Stone is making statements
to at any given time. However, from the context, although Deputy Hernandez
was present, it appears Stone is often talking to medical personnel.
2

2

I said, "Here's your stuff," and she carried the sewing machine to
the van and I -- and then she picked up some box and she set the
box down and the next thing I know, her head's turned and there's
a fricking knife going inside of me. I mean it - she probably had
only been there 60 seconds and we fought for, shit, I don't know, at
least - it seemed like an eternity but we fought for a bit over the
fricking knife. I had my hand on her knife. We were going back
and forth and . . .. The knife didn't just go in and out. The knife
was going (inaudible). She was trying to push it in and I was trying
to push it out and all we were doing was we were doing this. And
then I thought about my gun. I pulled my gun right out of my -- I
have a little J-Frame Smith and Wesson that I carry and I just went
bam, bam right in the back of her head and then I took my knife out.
And then I thought holy shit. What do I do?
(Exhibit 1, p.20, LsA-22.)
On the way to and while at the hospital, Stone continued to talk to Deputy
Hernandez. Stone's statements included: (1) "I have nothing to hide." (Exhibit
1, p.1S, L.1S); (2) "I'm not making no bones. I shot my wife. I ain't making no
bones about it." (Exhibit 1, p.1S, Ls.17-1S); (3) "I just killed my wife." (Exhibit 1,
p.6); (4) "Fuck. What a stupid bitch." (Exhibit 1, p.17, L.1S); (S) "What a stupid
bitch to pull a knife." (Exhibit 1, p.1S, L.24); (6) "I'm cognitive, I'm coherent, I'm in
a little bit of pain. I feel awful about what just happened but to tell you the truth,
the way she was looking at me, one of us was going to die or get really fucked up
and I didn't choose this." (Exhibit 1, p.23, LsA-S); (7) "Oh, shit, man. You know
what? (Inaudible) their mommy's gone. It doesn't bother me that she's gone for
what she did to me." (Exhibit 1, p.2S, Ls.20-22); (S) "As far as I'm concerned, it
was my life or hers and I ain't the one that started this shit. I'm glad my kids were
not at home. We got into a big thing about that because tonight my kids are all, 'I
don't want to go to grandma and grandpa's today.

We want to stay at home ... '

I'm all, 'You know the way your mom and I are. We're probably going to be out
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there fighting and she's going to be unhappy about what she gets. She's going
to be unhappy about this and I don't want --' and I talk like that to them." (Exhibit
1, p.29, Ls.7-17); (9) "Bam, bam. And I shot twice.

I hope that was the right

thing. I fired once and I -- and I just always thought if I ever got in a gun fight, I'd
shoot at least twice. . .. I've read enough books and things, you know, that's a
good thing to do." (Exhibit 1, p.34, L.24 - p.35, L.6); (10) "(Inaudible) think maybe
I should be scared to death and going to jail for the rest of my life but I'm really
not because, you know, I mean it's not like they -- it's not like I walked up there
and shot her or it's not like I walked into a liquor store and shot someone to steal
money.... It was going to be me or her." (Exhibit 1, pA8, Ls.8-15); (11) "[S]he
likes to fuck guys." (Exhibit 1, p.51, L.19); (12) "And I've had it with the affairs."
(Exhibit 1, p.52, L.12); (13) "I mean if she would have been faithful to me ...
we'd still be married and she'd still be alive .... And our kids would be happy."
(Exhibit 1, p.52, L.23 - p.53, LA); (14) "[She has been in the United States]
[s]ince she was 18 when we got married .... She married me for a green card. I
don't know about that because we had - we had many happy years together."
(Exhibit 1, p.55, L.24 - p.56, L.5); (15) "I have a concealed weapons permit. I
know that doesn't give me the right to go around and shoot people .... I've read
up on the law a lot but I do know one thing, if I -- even having that, that permit
didn't save my life .... What saved my life is deciding to put that gun in my
pocket tonight and I'm usually in the habit of doing that." (Exhibit 1, p.57, L.25 p.58, L.10); (16) "She's a nice girl. She's just -- if she was a faithful girl, we'd still
be married. She'd be alive and I wouldn't be sitting here." (Exhibit 1, p.60, Ls.13-
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15); (17) "I'm not scared . . . . Maybe I should be.

Maybe I'm stupid . . . .

(Inaudible) one of us was going to -- we were both going to get messed up or one
of us was going to die." (Exhibit 1, p.61, Ls.2-S); and (1S) "What a stupid bitch.
What a stupid bitch." (Exhibit 1, p.62, Ls.16-17).
As Stone reiterated his opinion that Florence was a "stupid bitch,"
Detective Christopher McCormick entered the hospital room where Stone was
and introduced himself. (Exhibit 2, p.3, Ls.11-13; Tr., p.254, Ls.4-12.) Stone and
Detective McCormick then engaged in the following conversation:
MR. STONE: ... If your name is Chris, I already like you.
DET. McCORMICK: Well, you know, I appreciate that. It looks like
you've been here hanging out with Frank [Hernandez], my buddy,
here for a while.
MR. STONE: Yeah.
DET. McCORMICK: Are they taking good care of you?
MR. STONE: Are you a cop too?
DET. McCORMICK: I'm a cop too. (Inaudible) haircut, Frank?
MR. STONE: He's taken real good care of me. I was just sitting
here telling him maybe I'm a fool but I'm not even that -- you heard
what happened.
DET. McCORMICK: I've got a little bit of it.
MR. STONE: I guess that's - you're here to ask some questions.
DET. McCORMICK: Sure.
MR. STONE: I'm not even going to -- maybe I should be scared to
death about going to jail but to be honest with you, I ain't scared.
DET. McCORMICK: You know what, Chris We just want to--
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MR. STONE: My wife was going to die, I was going to die or we
were both going to get messed up with a knife.
DET. McCORMICK: That's what we're here for.
what happened.

I want to know

MR. STONE: And she made that choice.
(Exhibit 2, p.3, L.14 - pA, L.15.)
Detective McCormick then told Stone he "want[ed] to know what
happened," but first wanted to make sure they made appropriate arrangements
for Stone's children.

(Exhibit 2, pA, Ls.16-18.)

After addressing this issue,

Detective McCormick again advised Stone of his Miranda rights and Stone
reiterated that he understood those rights. (Exhibit 2, p.9, L.23 - p.1 0, L.11; Tr.,
p.256, Ls.17-24.) Detective McCormick testified that Stone's demeanor at that
time was "[p]leasant, joking, alert, lucid" and he noted Stone was "talkative" and
"appear[ed] to be outgoing." (Tr., p.258, Ls.8-19.) Detective McCormick further
testified that Stone appeared to understand what he was being asked, was
coherent, and did not seem to be under the influence. (Tr., p.259, LA - p.260,
L.3.)
When Detective McCormick ultimately asked Stone what happened, Stone
said: "I told Frank [Hernandez] 100 times. 1'1/ tell you." (Exhibit 2, p.11, Ls.3-5.)
Stone then proceeded to describe his past and present relationship with his wife,
including her past infidelity and their contentious divorce proceedings, and he
repeated that Florence stabbed him, so he shot her. (See generally Exhibit 2,
pp.11-18.) Detective McCormick then asked Stone for additional detail regarding
the knife, how Florence allegedly stabbed him, and how Stone shot her. (Exhibit
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2, pp.1S-50.) Stone and Detective McCormick then discussed what Stone did
after he shot Florence.

(Exhibit 2, pp.51-54.)

Stone also told Detective

McCormick that his wife had a habit of pulling knives on him, "noting she's a
Philippino [sic] girl and she was using a machete.

I'm not going to say she's

been fascinated by knives but whenever she'd get mad at me, she probably
picked up a knife a dozen times since we've been married." (Exhibit 2, p.56,
Ls.19-23.) Stone also insisted, "She came over there to do this to me tonight."
(Exhibit 2, p.65, Ls.14-15; see also p.65, L.23 - p.66, L.2.)
At one point during Detective McCormick's interview of Stone, Stone was
transported to get a CAT scan. (See Exhibit 2, p.90, LsA-6; Tr., p.262, Ls.2123.)

Shortly before that happened, Stone asked Detective McCormick, "Does

that sound sick saying that [I don't feel bad about shooting her] or how does that
-- that must sound really like I'm a heartless person but it's either her or me."
(Exhibit 2, p.95, Ls.6-S.) Detective McCormick answered:
You know, Chris, like I told you when I came in here, I don't
judge, you know. What you think, what you feel, why it is you feel
the way you do, there's a reason for it and that's something you
need to come to terms with.
I'm here to make sure - you know, find out what happened
at the house because, like I said, the two people that were there,
one of them I can't talk to right now. So you're about the best
means aside from my CSl's that are there at the scene.
The good thing is I've got some really good CSI's there so,
you know, just like the movie -- the difference between us and the
movies, the movies, everything's done in half an hour. It's going to
be a long drawn out process but they are good. We're able to
substantiate or disprove, you know, pretty much anything and
everything you said.
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So that's why -- you know, it's a testing thing. Not only are
you my only witness on this but it's also it's a testing thing because
I can tell if you're being honest with me, if you're being .truthful
based on what you're telling me, based on what's on scene. The
scene tells what happened. There's no two ways about it.
So I need to get your side of it. I talked to the guys on
scene. They tell me, yeah this is - this is the position she was in
when she got shot. This, that and the other matches. It all makes
sense. If there's something that doesn't match, that's when we go
back and we revisit it and find out why it isn't matching. What
happened what was the loss in translation.
(Exhibit 2, p.95, L.9 -

p.96, L.12.)

Stone's response and the ensuing

conversation was as follows:
MR. STONE: I know one thing for sure, man, I never -- I never saw
the front of her face. Look - I saw her from the back but I know
when I - when I leaned over, there was a lot of blood.
DET. McCORMICK: These guys are really eager to get you on
there. I know I'm holding you up. One last question I had for you.
You said all the other - the dozen times that she's wielded a knife,
My
had a knife, you never felt threatened at that point.
understanding she's a pretty small petite little girl for the most part?
MR. STONE: Yeah.
DET. McCORMICK: You said that she was fighting you pretty good
from this position. I'm thinking -- just myself and I'd like to think I'm
in decent shape. I don't have a whole lot of strength at this
position. I'm trying to figure out why she would put up such a fight
or if she was trying to assault you, why she would have done it from
there. If I had intentions of killing you, I'd probably do it head on or
I'd get you behind the back or I'd do something. This kind of puts
her in a vulnerable position if she wants -- you know what I'm
saying?
MR. STONE: That's really true.
DET. McCORMICK: It's really kind of bothering me.
MR. STONE: And she has no clue that I carry that gun because -- I
mean she knows I carry that gun everywhere but I was at our
house and there are a lot of times at the house that I don't carry the
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gun. But typically when she's come by ... to pick up belongings
just because of going through the divorce, I put that gun in my
pocket.
DET. McCORMICK: Think about what we talked about. These
guys will get you taken care of. We'll talk about it again here in just
a little bit. Okay?
(Exhibit 2, p.96, L.13 - p.97, L.23.) Stone was then transported to get a CAT
scan. (See Tr., p.262, L.23 - p.263, L.5.)
When Stone returned from the CAT scan approximately 45 minutes later,
"he change[d] his story slightly ... as far as his positioning when all this took
place." (Tr., p.263, Ls.5-S.)

Detective McCormick was also able to view the

results of the scan, which showed Stone's injury "protruded at a downward
angle." (Tr., p.264, L.23 - p.265, L.6.) Detective McCormick confronted Stone
with this information and told Stone he believed Stone tried to stab himself. (Tr'J
p.265, L.7 - p.266, L.5.) Stone denied Detective McCormick's allegation. (Tr.,
p.266, Ls.10-12.) Although Stone never admitted he stabbed himself, he later
told Detective McCormick that he and Florence exchanged "some nasty words,"
which included Florence telling him "I just married you for a green card." (Exhibit
2, p.292, LS.17 -19.) According to Stone, Florence said that "with her back to
[him]" and he "pulled out [his] gun" and said, "I should just fucking kill you you
lousy whore." (Exhibit 2, p.292, Ls.20-21.) Then, in Stone's words, Florence
turned around and she had her little knife with her and we got into
each other's face and we started saying shit to each other and she
poked me with the knife and she started -- and I lifted my gun up
and that's when I was going to shoot her and she turned her back
to me and I killed her and that is the end of that. But if she -- we -we were doing this kind of shit like this and I had the gun up and I'm
telling her, ''I'm going to kill your ass," and I was doing that to her.
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(Exhibit 2, p.292, L23 - p.293, L6.)
A grand jury returned a superceding indictment charging Stone with
second-degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime;
however, the indictment was subsequently amended, by stipulation, to allege
second-degree murder with the firearm enhancement. (R., pp.28-29, 79, 84-85.)
Stone filed a motion to suppress, asserting his "interrogation ... was conducted
in violation of his rights to remain silent, to due process of law, and to the
assistance of counsel." (R., p.60.) At the hearing on his motion to suppress,
Stone presented the testimony of two experts, Dr. Richard Ofshe and Dr. Craig
Beaver. 3 Dr. Ofshe is a sociology professor who generally testified about police
interrogation techniques and how he believed those techniques were employed
during Detective McCormick's interview of Stone. (See generally Tr., pp.18-143
and Exhibit A.)
Dr. Beaver, a neuropsychologist who evaluated Stone and reviewed the
medical records from Stone's treatment at Saint Alphonsus the night Stone
murdered Florence as well as Detective McCormick's interview (Tr., pp.159-169),
testified that, in his opinion, Stone is "highly suggestible in comparison to the
average person" (Tr., p.169, Ls.14-15). Dr. Beaver noted Stone's score on the
"Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales" was "high in comparison to other criminal
defendants" and indicated "substantial suggestibility." (Tr., p.171, Ls.14-18,
p.176, Ls.7-15.) Dr. Beaver indicated Stone's score on the Gudjonsson test was

The court allowed the testimony of Drs. Ofshe and Beaver as "offers of proof'
and reserved ruling on whether the testimony would be considered in
determining the merits of Stone's suppression motion. (Tr., p.151, Ls.7-11.)
3
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the "strongest piece of data on that particular project [sic]." (Tr., p.177, Ls.1014.) Dr. Beaver further testified that although "Stone looks adequate in that he
has average intelligence," "a master's degree related to speech pathology," and
was "employed as a professional within the school district," Stone "describes a
history of being socially anxious, ... , having difficulty with crowds, new social
situations, not forming relationships within a social context," is "quite attached to
his parents, but almost in a somewhat dependent way," and "describes having
struggles with depression off and on" including being "psychiatrically hospitalized
... a few years ago for a brief period of time when he was first diagnosed with
diabetes." (Tr., p.170, L.7 - p.171, L.3.) According to Dr. Beaver, individuals,
like Stone, who have "social anxiety are more prone to want to please people in
authority or power" and "have difficulty thinking as clearly or recalling information
as clearly." (Tr., p.177, L.25 - p.178, L.11.) Dr. Beaver also opined that Stone's
general anxious disposition would be exacerbated by the "situation" he was in
after he shot his wife and that "the context in which the interrogation by law
enforcement took place would substantially increase the likelihood of his
suggestibility" such that Stone was "not able to resist the stories and questions
that the law enforcement person was offering to him."

(Tr., p.178, Ls.12-20;

p.181, L.4-p.182, L.11; p.188, Ls.2-5; p.189, L.25-p.190, L.7.)
Dr. Beaver also provided testimony about Stone's blood sugar levels and
the medication he was given while at Saint Alphonsus. Regarding Stone's blood
sugar, Dr. Beaver noted Stone has Type II diabetes, which by Stone's own
admission he "doesn't do a good job of controlling," and the "CBC workup that
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was done at Saint Alphonsus indicated that his blood sugar level was over 400."
(Tr., p.183, Ls.3-9.) Dr. Beaver stated this elevated blood sugar level "has an
impact on a person's ability to think very clearly." (Tr., p.183, Ls.17-19.) With
respect to the medication administered to Stone at the hospital, Dr. Beaver
testified Stone was given Dilaudid, which he describes as a "very potent opiate
type medication" that "has an almost hypnotic effect on individuals" such that it
"not only clouds their perception and their thinking skills, but generally relaxes
them, thus reducing their defenses." (Tr., p.183, L.20 - p.184, L.8.)
After post-hearing briefing and oral argument, the court denied Stone's
suppression motion. (Tr., pp.378-405; see also R., p.110.) In doing so, the court
considered the entirety of Dr. Ofshe's testimony (Tr., p.383, L.20 - p.384, L.1)
and Dr. Beaver's testimony about Stone's "diabetes and the effects of the pain
medications administered to [him]," but "decline[d] to consider Dr. Beaver's
testimony on the psychological makeup which may have caused [Stone] to
change his recollection of events." (Tr., p.384, Ls.6-13).
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, in which Stone preserved
his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion, Stone pled guilty
to second-degree murder and the state dismissed the sentencing enhancement
and agreed to recommend a unified twenty-year sentence with ten years fixed,
with Stone free to argue for a lesser sentence. (R., pp.135-139, 142-146.) The
court imposed a unified twenty-year sentence with nine years fixed, and Stone
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.165-169.)

12

ISSUES

Stone states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the court err in declining to consider the entire testimony
of Craig Beaver in support of the motion to suppress?
2.
Did the court err in concluding that the statements were
made voluntary in light ofthe evidence before it?
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.12.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Stone failed to establish any error in relation to the district court's
decision denying his motion to suppress?

13

ARGUMENT
Stone Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Stone asserts the district court erred in concluding his statements were

voluntary and not the product of police coercion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-32.) A
review of the record and the applicable legal standards shows Stone has failed to
show error in the district court's contrary conclusion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

State v.

Thus, where an

appellant claims his statements were involuntary, this Court gives "deference to
the lower court's findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages
in "free review over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally
sufficient to show voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d
159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal
question freely reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). If
the state proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's
statements were voluntarily made, suppression is not appropriate. Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); State v. Valero, _
1014,1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
14

Idaho _ , 285 P.3d

C.

Stone's Statements Were Not The Product Of Coercion, Which Is A
Necessary Predicate To A Finding That His Admissions Were Not
Voluntary
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a

confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).

Indeed, "coercive government misconduct was the catalyst for th[e] [Supreme]
Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Mississippi," 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
and "the cases considered by th[e] Court" post-Brown "have focused upon the
crucial element of police overreaching." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-164. "While
each confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the
conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial
element of coercive police conduct."

kL at 164.

"Absent police conduct causally

related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state
actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law."

kL

Stone acknowledges, as he must, that "police overreaching is necessary
to establish involuntariness." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (emphasis original).) He
argues, however, that such overreaching occurred in this case, claiming he was
(1) "taken into custody at gunpoint sometime shortly after 6:00 p.m. and
remained in the custody of police officers for the ensuing eight hours;" (2)
"extensively questioned, resulting in a transcript of some 396 pages;" (3)
"subjected to incommunicado detention;" (4) "denied access to his parents
despite repeated requests (both by him and his parents) for a meeting;" (5)
"denied access to his cell phone, by which he could have contacted [his parents]
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or other supportive persons directly;" (6) "denied access to a bathroom;" and (7)
"subjected to psychologically coercive interrogation techniques."

(Appellant's

Brief, p.15.) Stone's assertions are, in some instances, factually erroneous and
otherwise fail to show coercive police conduct. Each assertion will be addressed
in turn.
While the police undoubtedly had their weapons drawn when they first
approached Stone, to claim this was improper, much less legally significant in
relation to statements made several hours later, is disingenuous. Not only is it
unsurprising that law enforcement would approach Stone in the manner they did
given the circumstances with which they were confronted, it was constitutionally
reasonable and ultimately has no logical relationship to any claim by Stone that
his subsequent admissions were involuntary. There is no evidence that Stone
was held at gunpoint once he was placed in handcuffs, which were removed to
facilitate medical care (Tr., p.393, Ls.14-17), nor is there evidence that any
member of law enforcement drew a weapon at anytime during the ensuing eight
hours. To claim, as Stone does, that the officers' act of drawing a weapon when
responding to a scene where someone has been shot constitutes any sort of
overreaching or coercion is completely without merit.
The fact that Stone was in the presence of law enforcement for eight
hours also fails to demonstrate police overreaching.

It is not as if the police

detained Stone at the station or any other building affiliated with law
enforcement. Indeed, the district court found that Stone was not even in custody.
(Tr., p.393, L.21 - p.395, L.5.) The eight hours Stone refers to covers the period
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extending from the initial contact to Stone's arrest. During that entire time, Stone
was either at his house, in the ambulance, or at the hospital being treated. The
police certainly were not overreaching by insisting that a member of law
enforcement remain in Stone's presence during that period given that he readily
and immediately admitted he shot his estranged wife. Even if Stone's medical
care concluded prior to the expiration of that eight-hour period, it was not
coercive for the police to continue to interview him. If anything, continuing the
interview in the hospital setting weighs against any claim of coercion as it is not
the sort of "police-dominated atmosphere" that led the Supreme Court to require
Miranda warnings.
mandated

by

Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) ("The warning

Miranda

was

meant

to

preserve

the

privilege

during

incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.
That atmosphere is said to generate inherently compelling pressures which work
to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise freely do so.") (citations and quotations omitted).
Although Stone was undoubtedly questioned, this fact alone does not
constitute coercion and it is hardly significant that the transcript of the interviews
was "some 369 pages." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The transcripts of the relevant
interviews reveal not only multiple conversations completely unrelated to the
murder, including conversations with medical personnel, they also reflect Stone
was extremely talkative. The length of the transcripts is in no way meaningful to
the question of coercion.
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Stone's claim that he was subjected to "incommunicado detention" is also
belied by the record. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) As noted, Stone was not secluded
by law enforcement and denied contact with anyone other than police. He was at
a hospital, frequently in the company of medical staff, and was in no way isolated
from the outside world, which is a significant circumstance when considering any
claim of coercion. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, 438-439 (1984)
(rejecting argument that Miranda should be extended to traffic stops, noting "[t]he
purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently
compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself," and reasoning
those purposes are not advanced in traffic stops given the exposure of such
stops to "public view," which "both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous
policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and
diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected
to abuse") (citations omitted). That he was not allowed to make any calls was
also not coercive for at least two reasons. First, when police first responded to
Stone's house, Stone was on the telephone - an opportunity that he apparently
took advantage of to do the very thing he claims police prevented - to "contact ..
. supportive persons directly."

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

Second, there is no

constitutional mandate requiring officers to allow an individual to use a phone
whenever he feels like it. While holding someone "incommunicado" is a relevant
factor to consider for purposes of analyzing police conduct, because Stone did
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not actually find himself in this position, he cannot establish any coercion based
on this factor.
Another claim contradicted by the record is that the police denied Stone
access to the bathroom. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) As reflected in the portion of
the transcript Stone cites in support of this assertion, this is simply not true. The
transcript (including the portion Stone cites and some additional conversation)
reads:
MR. STONE: If you could check, I'm going to have a big diarrhea
mess all over this bed. I don't know what these guys are doing.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
yeah.

No, no.

I know what you're saying,

MR. STONE: These doctors, I don't know if I got to poop myself
and wait for them to clean me up or what but -UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gosh.
MR. STONE: I've been telling them for a half an hour to - I just had
a major enema and it's all I can to keep it in me.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible.)
MR. STONE: They were going to let me out.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you. She's coming right now.
MR. STONE: And I don't know how much is going to come out but
I felt it starting to.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure. You know, I mean considering
the last couple of hours, you know.
(Exhibit 2, p.161, Ls.3-21.)
The state is confident, from the context of this exchange, that law
enforcement did not administer the enema or instruct Stone that he could not use
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the bathroom to relieve himself much less condition Stone's use of the bathroom
on his willingness to confess. While hospital staff may have restricted Stone's
ability to use the bathroom for medical reasons, their actions do not translate into
a finding of police overreaching. If anything, assuming the "unidentified speaker"
in the above excerpt was an officer, law enforcement was sympathetic to Stone's
needs but had no "authority" to interfere with Stone's medical care and give him
permission to use the bathroom.
Stone's final attempt to establish the coercion requirement rests on his
claim

that

techniques."

"he was

subjected

to

psychologically

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

coercive

interrogation

More specifically, Stone contends the

"officers deceptively posited themselves as friends ... or as neutral fact finders,"
"repeatedly use[d] the technique of minimization," and promised "leniency" in
return for Stone's admissions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-32 (emphasis omitted).)
Stone is incorrect.
Even a cursory analysis of the statements Stone relies on in an effort to
demonstrate coercion by kindness, fails to support his claim that any member of
law enforcement was trying to "trick" him into believing they were just friends.
For example, Stone asserts, "The police stated that 'our main concern now is
your well being internally, you know?'" (Appellant's Brief, p.25 (quoting Exhibit 1,
p.28, LS.20-21 ).) The full exchange reflected in the transcript is as follows:
MR. STONE: I hope I don't get in trouble over this. I know I killed
someone. I hope I don't get in trouble over this.
UNIDENTIFED SPEAKER: I'm not a police officer.

20

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Again, like he mentioned earlier, our
main concern now is your well being internally, you know?
(Exhibit 1, p.28, Ls.15-21.)
Again assuming the relevant unidentified speaker was actually a police
officer, it is unclear how a statement that, on its face, reflects concern for Stone's
injury can be interpreted as a coercive tactic designed to elicit an incriminating
response from Stone.

It is equally unclear how conveying to Stone that law

enforcement had an obligation to conduct a "very thorough investigation" to
protect Stone as much as Florence reflects an attempt to lull Stone into a false
sense of security or mislead him about the officers' intentions. (Appellant's Brief,
p.25 (quoting Exhibit 2, p.142, Ls.2-24).) This is especially true considering that
statement was made in response to Stone asking: "Will you guys be contacting
me? I don't even -- my kids are going to wonder why they're not going to school
tomorrow." (Exhibit 2, p.142, Ls.18-20.)
Detective McCormick's characterization of himself as a "fact finder" also
falls far short of demonstrating "psychological coercion" given that is precisely
what he was doing; that the "facts" are not favorable to Stone does not mean the
detective was overreaching. Frankly, the state's view of the interaction between
Stone and law enforcement is that it was Stone who went to great lengths to
befriend the officers, perhaps believing it would improve his chances of being
found credible. That said, even if the officers' comments can be fairly interpreted
as attempts to befriend Stone, displays of friendship or sympathy are not
improper and do not qualify as coercion.

See,~,

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.

104 (1985); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho
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926, 894 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that because the defendant
understood his Miranda rights, downplaying the seriousness of the charges,
stressing the harm that might come to Wilson's family, and implying that leniency
would follow a confession, did not make confession involuntary); Beltz v. State,
980 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (noting general rule that being
sympathetic or friendly or professing a desire to help the defendant "does not
itself render a subsequent confession involuntary"); Sheriff, Washoe County v.
Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 621-622 (Nevada 1996) (noting police techniques such as
"offering false sympathy, blaming the victim, minimizing the seriousness of the
charge, using a good-cap/bad-cop routine, or suggesting there is sufficient
evidence when there is not" are permissible police interviewing techniques).
Stone's minimization claim is closely intertwined with his claim that
Detective McCormick improperly promised leniency if Stone would admit that
Florence did not actually stab him.

Stone argues that Detective McCormick

minimized what Stone had done by noting it was not the "crime of the century"
and asserts "[m]inimization is a well-recognized technique for impliedly promising
leniency." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Although Stone restates the argument in
several ways, the leniency Stone ultimately claims Detective McCormick
promised was that if Stone agreed to Detective McCormick's "view of what
transpired," the judge would be more lenient. (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) In order
to make this argument, Stone essentially reconstructs the sequence of
questioning to bolster his proposition.

For example, Stone notes Detective

McCormick told him he was "trying to give [Stone] an out" and "then ... warn[ed]
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[Stone] that failing to take his 'way out''' would have "tragic consequences," as
illustrated by Detective McCormick telling Stone earlier, "I need to know because
if I don't know then I've got to put these pieces together and fill the blanks with
what I think happened." (Appellant's Brief, p.29 (citations omitted).) Stone then
goes on to string together statements from various parts of the interview without
regard to context. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.)
Acknowledging

that

the

Court

will

consider the

totality

of the

circumstances in determining whether Detective McCormick's actions were
coercive, it is still important to evaluate the entirety of the interaction between
Detective McCormick and Stone as it occurred and with due consideration for the
statements Stone was making. Viewed appropriately in that light, Stone's claim
that Detective McCormick was improperly implying or promising leniency in an
effort to coerce Stone to make admissions fails.
The dynamic of the relationship between Detective McCormick and Stone
from the outset was congenial.

Stone immediately expressed a willingness to

talk and tell his "side of the story." The dynamic, however, began to shift when
Detective McCormick confronted Stone with the fact that his story was
implausible in light of the results of the CAT scan.4 Shortly thereafter, Stone said
he was "feel[ing] like" he did not want to talk "without [his attorney]." (Exhibit 2,
p.230, Ls.15-17.)

Detective McCormick responded by telling Stone, who had

already been twice advised of his Miranda rights, that he could not "control" what

4 If the length of the transcript is notable, as Stone suggests, this shift in the
dynamic did not occur until page 218 of the second transcript, which is only 310
pages long. (Exhibit 2.)
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Stone did, to which Stone answered, "But I don't feel like I have anything to hide."
(Exhibit 2, p.230, Ls.20-23.)

Despite reiterating his awareness that he could

consult an attorney, Stone continued to talk and ultimately told Detective
McCormick that he pointed a gun at Florence and shot her after she told him she
married him for a green card. (Exhibit, p.292, L.19 - p.293, L.6.)
Although Detective McCormick told Stone he thought whatever happened
"was heat of the moment" (Exhibit 2, p.250, Ls.2-3), he did not "feed" any "story"
to Stone. Instead, he asked Stone what happened that "sent it over the edge"
(Exhibit 2, p.258, L.1), "[w]hat took [him] to that point" (Exhibit 2, p.265, LS.1516). Pressing Stone for an answer was not overreaching just because it was
effective Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) ("[P]olice questioning
as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws cannot be doubted.
Admissions of guilt are more than merely desirable, they are essential to a
society's compelling interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who
violate the law."); United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9 th Cir.
2004) (en bane) ("Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a

confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in
custodial ones as well, unless the government makes threats or promises.")
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Nor does Stone's alleged "susceptibility
to suggestion" convert otherwise proper questioning into coercive misconduct.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165-166 (rejecting suggestion that voluntariness inquiry
include courts to "divine a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did
even though there be no claim that the governmental conduct coerced his
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decision").

The district court's decision not to consider this aspect of Dr.

Beaver's testimony was, therefore, proper. 5
Also contrary to Stone's claims, Detective McCormick did not engage in
overreaching by making any implied promise of leniency.

To the contrary,

Detective McCormick specifically told Stone he did not have the power to do so
because the judge is the "decision maker." (Exhibit 2, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.1.)
That Detective McCormick shared his experience of seeing defendants getting
credit for accepting responsibility was not improper and does not mean he made
any promise to Stone, implied or otherwise, that a judge would be more lenient if
Stone accepted responsibility. See Wilson, supra.
Because there was

nothing

coercive

about the

conduct of law

enforcement in this case, Stone cannot show error in the denial of his motion to
suppress.

D.

Even If The Court Considers Other Factors Relating To Voluntariness
Despite The Lack Of Any Coercive Police Conduct, None Of Those
Factors Support Stone's Claim That His Admissions Were Involuntary
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne by coercive

police conduct, courts consider "the characteristics of the accused and the details
of the interrogation," which include: "(1) whether Miranda warnings were given;
(2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused's level of education or low

Stone's claim that the court erred in declining to consider Dr. Beaver's
testimony regarding Stone's alleged suggestibility presumes the factual predicate
of coercion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-18.) Because that factual predicate does
not exist, Stone's claim of error in relation to the court's limited consideration of
Dr. Beaver's testimony necessarily fails.
5
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intelligence; (4) the length of the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; and (6) deprivation of food or sleep." State v. Valero,
_

Idaho _ , 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) and State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211,214,
858 P.2d 750, 753 (Ct. App. 1993».
Stone acknowledges, as he must, that he received Miranda warnings.
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)

Nevertheless, Stone argues the "fact that Miranda

warnings were administered has very little to do with whether his statements
were voluntary given how the police downplayed the warning's importance" by
"implying that they were mere formalities."

(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)

This

argument is without merit. The record reflects that both Deputy Hernandez and
Detective McCormick clearly advised Stone of his Miranda rights and confirmed
that he understood those rights. Neither the record nor the law support Stone's
claim that those warnings were ineffectual because the officers "downplayed" the
significance of those rights.

See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09

(2004) ("giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a
virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even
though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual
stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid
waiver"); State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519,523-524,50 P.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (2002)
(rejecting claim that Miranda warnings were ineffectual because the detective
referred to them as a "little sheet of paper" given that the detective "carefully
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recite[d] the warnings to Doe" and Doe made it clear he knew what the warnings
were and understood what they meant).
Stone also asserts he "repeatedly inquired of the officers whether" talking
to them "was in his best interest and whether he should have the advice of
counsel before proceeding."

(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)

This is an inaccurate

portrayal of Stone's interaction with lawenforcement. When Stone asked Deputy
Hernandez whether it was in his "best interests to just be quiet," Deputy
Hernandez responded: "Completely up to you." (Exhibit 1, p.3, Ls.11-13.) Stone
then makes a comment about "what happened," and the deputy says, "And
obviously we like to get two sides of the story, you know what I mean?" but he
did not, at that time, ask Stone what happened.

(Exhibit 1, p.3, Ls.15-16.)

Instead, Stone says, "I'll do whatever you want. I'm a professional." (Exhibit 1,
p.3, Ls.18-19.)

Stone then proceeds to volunteer information without being

asked any questions. (See generally Exhibit 1, pp.3-6.)
Regarding Stone's claim that he "repeatedly" asked whether he should
have the advice of counsel before talking, the following comment by Stone is
representative of what Stone would say: "I hope I'm doing the right thing talking
to you guys because I'm working with an attorney closely with this divorce.

I

hope I'm -- he's not going to tell me I've been a major jackass talking to you
tonight but I really don't feel like I have anything to hide from you guys at all."
(Exhibit 2, p.73, L.22 - p.75, L.2.)

This type of comment hardly reflects an

inquiry _of law enforcement about whether Stone personally thinks he should talk
to law enforcement; to the contrary, Stone does not believe he has "anything to
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hide."

Stone did not express any real reluctance about talking to law

enforcement until after Detective McCormick told him he did not believe Florence
stabbed Stone as he claimed. That Stone thought, at that point, that he "should
have lawyered up" (Exhibit 2, p.238, Ls.8-9), does not mean the officers' Miranda
warnings were inadequate or that they "downplayed" the "significance of them."
If anything, as noted by the district court, the comments Stone did make about
waiving his rights reflect his awareness of those rights (Tr., p.396, L.18 - p.397,
L.3) and the record reflects he was perfectly willing to forego those rights in a
clear effort to convince law enforcement that he acted in self-defense when he
shot Florence twice in the back of the head.
With respect to Stone's age and level of education, the district court found
that neither characteristic weighed in Stone's favor given that Stone had a
master's degree and was, at the time of the murder, 49 years old. (Tr., p.399,
Ls.7-21.) It appears Stone seeks to avoid having this factor considered against
him by noting that, despite his age, he "never had any contact with law
enforcement."

(Appellant's Brief, p.21.)

Experience with law enforcement is,

however, a different consideration than age and, in any event, this fact is not
particularly compelling in this case considering Stone told Deputy Hernandez he
"read up on the law a lot" (Exhibit 1, p.58, L.4) and told Detective McCormick how
much he liked watching The First 48 (Exhibit 2, p.245, Ls.16-22), which is a
reality show that "takes viewers behind the scenes of real-life investigations as it
follows homicide detectives in the critical first 48 hours of murder investigations,
giving viewers unprecedented access to crime scenes, interrogations and
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forensic processing." http://www.aetv.com/the-first-48/aboutl (emphasis added).
Thus, even if Stone himself had never been subject to police questioning, he
apparently regularly watched others who were.
The district court also found the other relevant circumstances did not
support Stone's claim that his confession was involuntary. Specifically, the court
found the "length of the detention" was not overbearing, particularly since much
of the interview was taking place while Stone was in the hospital for treatment,
the questioning was not repeated or prolonged (and to the extent the interview
was lengthy, that was due, in large part, to the fact that Stone was extremely
talkative), and there was no deprivation of food or sleep or any other "basic
need[] during the time that he was hospitalized." (Tr., p.399, L.22 - p.400, L.14.)
Stone has failed to show any of these findings by the district court were
erroneous.
In addition to the foregoing circumstances that are traditionally considered
in deciding whether a confession is voluntary, Stone also relies on his "physical,
emotional and psychological state during the interrogation," including the fact that
he had been involved in an "extremely stressful event," he "was in pain" for which
he had received medication, he had high blood sugar, was "not allowed to use
the bathroom," and was "refused the opportunity to meet with his parents or other
supportive persons." (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-25.) Nothing about any of these
circumstances individually, or in totality, support Stone's claim that his confession
was involuntary.
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As noted in Section C, supra, Stone's arguments based on the "stressful"
nature of the event, his ability to use the bathroom, and his ability to "meet with
his parents or other supportive persons," lend no support to his claim of
involuntariness.

Regarding his pain, pain medication, and blood sugar, the

district court aptly noted it could find no "evidence to substantiate claims that"
those factors "affect[ed] his mental acuity." (Tr., p.401, Ls.18-20.) The record
supports this conclusion.
Because there was no coercive police conduct, Stone was not entitled to
suppression. In addition to any lack of coercion, the totality of the circumstances
support the conclusion that Stone's admissions were voluntary.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Stone's motion to suppress and affirm the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to second-degree murder.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2012.

JESSI¢~ M.LORELLO
Deput>t,Attorney General
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